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1 A problem of size
[. . . ] Thus, category theory is not just another field
whose set-theoretic foundation can be left as an exer-
cise. An interaction between category theory and set
theory arises because there is a real question: what
is the appropiate set-theoretic foundation of category
theory?
Andreas Blass1
It is common to date the birth of category theory to the publication of Eilenberg and Mac
Lane’s paper,2 A general theory of natural equivalences. Already in this pioneering work,
we can find a first analysis of some foundational issues concerning the raising theory. In fact
Eilenberg and Mac Lane dedicate an entire paragraph to discuss some foundational problems
of the set-theoretical interpretation of their theory. Here is the beginning of this paragraph:3
We remarked in §3 that such examples as the “category of all sets”, the “category
of all groups” are illegitimate. The difficulties and antinomies here involved are
exactly those of ordinary intuitive Mengenlehre; no essentially new paradoxes are
apparently involved. Any rigorous foundation capable of supporting the ordinary
theory of classes would equally well support our theory. Hence we have chosen
to adopt the intuitive standpoint, leaving the reader free whatever type of logical
foundation (or absence thereof) he may prefer.
The two authors immediately recognise the peculiarity of the constructions involved in
their theory and offer a first simple diagnosis: since there is nothing new under the sun, just
old well-known paradoxes, it is sufficient to give back these issues to the field they belong, i.e.
set theory. Despite the apparent haste to dismiss the matter, what follows the above mentio-
ned paragraph can be seen as the first concrete attempt to solve the problem: after having
discussed some technical issues, the two mathematicians suggest a possible development of
category theory inside the framework of the theory of sets and classes in the style of von
Neumann, Bernays and Gödel’s set theory (NBG). Before entering into the details of this and
other proposals, it is important to focus on what is the problem. A good starting point is given
by a critical analysis of the role played by the notion of size in category theory. Indeed, with
the exception of set theory, it is difficult to find other mathematical fields where the notion of
size plays such a central role. On the other hand, in category theory the distinction between
small categories and large categories represents an important and inescapable dichoto-
my raised at the very beginning of any reasonable introduction to the subject. Nevertheless
it is usual to get rid of this question as soon as possible and the working mathematician who
uses category theory is therefore reluctant to deepen the analysis of the foundations of the
theory. The following dialogue4 is intended to parody this situation:
Dialogue 1.
2S. Eilenberg (1945).
3S. Eilenberg (1945), p. 246.
4The characters of this invented dialogue have been inspired by the dialogues in Hofstadter (1979).
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TORTOISE: Hi Achilles, how are you? You have disappeared for a while, what
have you been up to?
ACHILLES: My dear little Tortoise, you won’t believe it, but I started studying
some abstract nonsense. And, let me say that I found in it much more
sense than is usually said.
TORTOISE: Good Achilles, I see you are not losing the habit to challenge your
mind. I also have tried to give meaning to that bunch of arrows some
time ago. . . now, I can just remember the definition of a category. Let
me take the opportunity to ask you something that has bothered me sin-
ce that time. Can you tell me what people mean with the term large
category?
ACHILLES: Oh, my sweet little Tortoise, I know what you are driving at. . . you
want to cheat me with the old story of the barber undecided if he shaves
himself or not. . . this time I won’t fell for it. The matter is simple: a large
category is one whose collection of morphisms is a proper class.
TORTOISE: Then, let me bother you with my usual reasoning. The natural
question to pose now is: what do you mean by proper class?
ACHILLES: Well, I’ll be polite and I won’t escape your innocent inquisition. I
will call a proper class a collection which is not a set.
TORTOISE: It’s not exactly a definition, but I’ll give you that. I believe you
already know what I am going to ask next. . .
ACHILLES: Let’s see. Usually you don’t have so much imagination. The only
new term I introduced in our dialogue is set. I hope you don’t want to
ask me what is a set. . .
TORTOISE: Exactly Achilles: less fantasy and more pedantry is the recipe of
my philosophy. . .
ACHILLES: Ok. Let me surprise you. I have a new definition: a set is an
object of the category Set, whose object are sets and whose morphisms
are functions.
TORTOISE: Mmh. . . , you are right Achilles, you always surprise me. . . I am
afraid you lost your way in an abstract nonsense. . .
Clearly positions like Achilles’ one are unsatisfying from every possible point of view:
mathematical, logical and philosophical. A proper category theorist, probably, would have
preferred to answer Tortoise’s question, “what is a set”, saying “it’s an object of a well-pointed
topos with a natural number object and which satisfies the axiom of choice”. Since this answer
costs much more effort than trying to understand the problem, it is important to clarify what
we mean by the problem of set-theoretic foundations of category theory, in such a way that
also Achilles can understand why his position is not defensible.
It is an empirical fact that, to a great extent, mathematics can be formalized in set theory:
a rather common choice for this set-theoretic “codification” is represented by the axioms of
Zermelo Fraenkel’s set theory with the axiom of choice (ZFC). For example, we can imagine
to present group theory, algebraic topology or functional anaysis with the language only of set
theory: objects of these theories can be described as sets whose properties can be derived from
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set-theoretic axioms. Following Blass,5 it is therefore natural to ask in what sense category
theory is an exception to this phenomenon. Why can’t we leave this codification as a routine
exercise?
As we have already observed, at the root of category theory lies the important small/large
distinction. When doing category theory some of the objects and constructions that we deal
with are (and have to be) essentially large. One of the first problem we meet if we regard this
object from a set- theoretic perspective is to find an adequate encoding for large categories
such as the category of all sets (Set) or the category of all groups (Grp). These categories are
built having in mind essentially large collections and cannot be treated simply as sets.6 This
is not the only problem. The following list resumes some of the main issues that are essential
to develop category theory.7 In every reasonable foundational framework8 we want to be able
to:
(A) form the category of every structure of a given type. Some elementary examples are:
Set, Grp and Top;
(B) perform some basic set-theoretic constructions over an arbitrary category;
(C) form the category of all the functors between two arbitrary categories.
If we are specifically interested in set-theoretic foundations for category theory we would
also like to be able to
(D) decide the consistency of these systems with respect to some accepted system of set
theory.
It is worth mentioning that, beyond the concept of “large category” (requirement A), there
are several different notions that rely on the same concept (locally small category, small
limits, etc.). The frameworks should be expressive enough to make sense of each of these.
As we will see the choice of a specific foundational system will affect substantially the
fulfilment of these requirements.
The next section gives an overview of the foundational proposals that we will consider in
the rest of the paper.
2 Set-theoretic and other proposals: a retrospective.
As already noted, debates about foundations of category theory started with the very intro-
duction of the notion of category. The rapid development of the theory and the ubiquity of
categorical notions in different mathematical fields have brought these foundational issues
to the attention of several mathematicians.
In the sequel we will consider some standard set-theoretic approaches to the problem
of foundations of category theory. It is important to keep in mind that set theory is just
one possible approach. Even among the set-theoretic frameworks, we won’t be able to cover
exhaustively all those proposed in the past, for example, Feferman’s proposal to use Quine’s
set theory, New Foundations.9 The question of what the proper set-theoretic foundation of
5See the quotation at the beginning of this section.
6The argument is well known. A possible way to present it is the following: if the collection of all sets, V , was a
set, then the collection of all its subsets, ℘V , would be a set included in V , contradicting Cantor’s theorem.
7Compare with Feferman (2006) pp. 2–3.
8We use framework as synonym of metatheory or foundational system.
9The interested reader should consult Feferman (2006).
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category theory is can be misleading. We could argue that category theory, as any other
mathematical subject, does not need any foundation either for its own internal development,
or for understanding it. Nevertheless, once we have raised the question, we find that different
solutions are at our disposal. As we will see none of the set-theoretical proposals we will
consider definitely solve the problem. However, we stress that to a great extent each of
these proposals is expressive enough to cover most of the cases of interest for the “working
mathematician”.
An important part in the debate of foundations of category theory that deserves a treat-
ment on its own, is the possibility to regard category theory itself as a foundational theory.
The idea to consider category theory as a universal language capable of interpreting the en-
tire mathematical edifice has been firstly proposed by Lawvere in the mid 60s. His research
has led to a purely categorical description of the category Set. Nowadays, after his influential
paper,10 it is common to refer to these axioms with the acronym ETCS: Elementary Theory of
the Category of Sets.
From a philosophical perspective, the project of Lawvere is intertwined with what has
been called categorical structuralism.11 As recent debates have shown, progress is impossi-
ble without a preliminarily agreed understanding of what is meant by the use of adjectives
“structural” and “foundational” in this context.12 Close to categorical structuralism, but not
coinciding with Lawvere’s position, is the idea to regard category theory as a foundation be-
cause of its unifying character. This position emerges for example in Marquis13 and has
recently been supported by some novel results discovered in topos theory.14
We finally mention a recent area of research that investigates set theory from a novel
categorical perspective: Algebraic Set Theory (AST). The main goal of AST is to give a uniform
categorical description for set-theoretical formal systems. Without addressing directly any
foundational issues, AST focuses on bringing to light algebraic aspects of these systems by
means of category theory.15
We can now focus on the organisation of the foundational proposals that we consider. The
frameworks we will treat are the following:
• an approach internal to ZFC,
• NBG and MK,16
• Grothendieck’s universes,
• Mac Lane’s proposal,
• Feferman’s proposal.
The first two set theories have in common the idea of using the notion of class to interpret
the notion of size arising in category theory. The other three, instead, make use (in a more
or less explicit way) of the notion of universe in order to better approximate the distinction
small/large. Inspired by Shulman (2008), we suggest a possible recast of these proposals by
means of these central notions.
10Lawvere (2005)
11See for example Awodey (1996), McLarty (2004).
12The interested reader should consult Hellman (2003) and Awodey (2004).
13See Marquis (2009).
14See Caramello (2010).
15A standard reference for AST is the book Joyal (1995). For a complete bibliography the reader should visit
http://www.phil.cmu.edu/projects/ast/.
16MK is the acronym for Morse-Kelley set theory.
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Before giving the details of these possible solutions we recall, in the next section, some
specific examples of theorems “sensitive to the mathematical framework”.
3 Examples
To give an idea of the ubiquity of notions of size in category theory we recall some basic re-
sults and definitions where these concepts play an important role17
Definition 1 (locally small category). A category C is called locally small if, given two objects,
a and b, the collection of morphisms between them, HomC(a, b), is small.
If a category C is locally small then there exists the Hom-functor:
HomC : C
op × C→ Set.
Examples of locally small categories are: Set, Grp and in general all the categories built
from “sets-with-structure”. Given two locally small categories C and D, the category of
functors between them, DC, is not in general, locally small.
A central notion in category theory is that of complete category: also in this case instances
of the notion of size are explicitly involved.
Definition 2 (complete category). A category C is said to be complete if every functor
F : J → C, whose domain is a small category J, has limit.
Examples of complete categories are: Set, Grp, Rng, Comp Haus. When the category is
both small and complete, then it is just a preorder. Actually something stronger holds:
Theorem 2. If a category C admits limits for any functor F : D → C, with D any discrete
category, then C is a preorder.
For the proof see Borceaux (1994), proposition 2.7.1. This theorem explains why, in order
to have a notion of completeness which makes sense for all categories, it is reasonable to ask
for limits just for those functors whose domain is a small category J .
Another important theorem which is usually quoted when debating foundational issue in
category theory is Freyd’s adjoint theorem. We briefly recall some definitions which occur in
the body of this theorem.
Definition 3. A category is said to be well-powered if each of its objects admits a poset of
subobjects.
Definition 4. A family Q of objects in a category C is called cogenerating if, given two pa-
rallel distinct morphisms, f 6= g : a → b, there is a morphism h : b → q with q ∈ Q such that
hf 6= hg.
Theorem 3. Given a locally small, complete, well-powered, category C endowed with a coge-
nerating set, and a category D, locally small, a functor G : C→ D has a left adjoint if and only
if it preserves small limits.
17Most of the examples here and in the rest of the paper can be found in Shulman (2008).
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For the proof see Lane (1998) ch. 5, par. 8. Note that this theorem relies essentially on so-
me notion of size. If the theorem is expressed just for small categories we obtain the following.
Corollary 4. Given a complete lattice, C, a lattice morphism, G : C → D, which preserves
infima has a left adjoint.
Clearly this corollary is just a shadow of Freyd’s adjoint theorem. The significance of this
latter can be appreciated if we think that in some cases this result represents the only device
to build an adjunction.
4 Large categories and classes
small = “set” / large = “class”
Classes (more precisely proper classes) arise in classical set theory (ZFC) as those lo-
gical formulas without proper citizenship in models of set theory. They are built from set-
theoretical formulas by means of unrestricted comprehension, and, even without a proper on-
tology,18 they are commonly introduced as a useful device for manipulating formulas they ab-
breviate. As we are going to see in the next paragraphs, classes represent possible candidates
to interpret large categories in a set-theoretical framework.
4.1 An approach internal to ZFC
A possible choice to give meaning to the notion of large categories is suggested by the usual
convention adopted to introduce classes in ZFC. A class in the language of ZFC is a formal
expression of the form x|φ(x) where φ is a formula of the language of ZFC. Every set can be
seen as a class (of its elements) but, by Russell’s paradox, the converse is not true. We say
that a class is a proper class if it is not a set.
Example 5. The class of all sets, V , is defined by the formula
V := {x|x = x}.
Another well-known proper class is the collection Ω of all ordinals. By the Burali-Forti
paradox it cannot be a set.
The idea of this foundational recipe is very simple: we call a category large when the
collection of its objects is a proper class.
One virtue of this approach is to work internally to ZFC: even if we cannot directly ma-
nipulate large objects we are still able to work with the properties (logical formulas in the
language of ZFC) which define them. In this way we still have the possibility to perform
simple basic constructions over large categories: for example if φ and ψ are formulas of ZFC
we can still form the class of pairs whose first element satisfy φ and whose second element
18They don’t have proper ontolgy since they are outside the domain of discourse described by the axioms. Following
Quine we can say that classes “do not have being” since they are not values of bound variables.
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satisfy ψ, i.e. we can form the cartesian product of the two categories corresponding to φ and
ψ.
The real problem of this approach is that ZFC cannot quantify over classes: theorems say-
ing “there is a category such that. . . ” or “for every category. . . ” cannot even be stated in ZFC
(one example is given by Freyd’s adjoint theorem). Therefore, if we choose this foundational
framework, we are led to reformulate most of our theorems as meta-theorems, which seems
quite unpleasant from a foundational perspective.
4.2 NBG and MK
The most common set theory which introduces an ontology both for classes and sets is von
Neumann, Bernays and Gödel’s set theory (NBG). We briefly recall the axioms
(i) axioms in common with ZFC: pair, union, infinity, powerset;
(ii) axioms both for sets and classes: extensionality, foundation;
(iii) axiom of limitation of size: a class is a set if and only if it is not in bijection with the
class of all sets V .
(iv) axiom schema of comprehension: for every property ϕ(x), without quantifiers over clas-
ses, there exists the class {x|ϕ(x)}.
The system NBG is a conservative extension of ZFC: every sentence, relative to sets, whi-
ch is provable in NBG, is already provable in ZFC. Therefore having NBG as a foundation
does not imply any particular ontological commitment. The differences with ZFC are mainly
at a stylistic level.19 As we mentioned in the first paragraph the use of NBG as a possible
foundation for category theory trace back to the original paper of Eilenberg and Mac Lane.20
The advantage of NBG with respect to ZFC consists essentially in the explicit treatment of
classes: several constructions become easier, and, moreover, it is legitimate to quantify over
classes. As suggested in Shulman (2008), another interesting feature of NBG consists in the
possibility of adopting a form of global choice. This, surprisingly, is an easy consequence of
the axioms. Consider the following observation due to von Neumann:
Theorem 6. In NBG, the class of all sets, V, is well-orderable.
Proof. The class Ω of all ordinals is a proper class and it is well-ordered. By the axiom of
limitation of size this class is in bijection with V . This bijection induces a well order on V .

The fact that V is well-orderable is one of the possible formulations of the axiom of choice
for classes; in category theory the possibility to have this large choice is sometimes essential.
In fact we are generally assuming it when choosing representatives of universal constructions
over large categories. Despite these good points, and the several advantages over the approa-
ch internal to ZFC, NBG still presents some problems as a possible foundational framework
for category theory: one, for example, is the use of comprehension restricted to formulas not
19Historically the interest in this system have been motivated by the search for an equivalent system to ZFC which
was finitely axiomatizable.
20S. Eilenberg (1945).
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involving classes.21 A possible solution is then to strengthen the axioms of NBG by allo-
wing for arbitrary quantification in the formulas involved. The resulting theory is known as
Morse-Kelley set theory (MK). In this case, however, we have lost conservativity over ZFC,
and the theory we end up with is genuinely stronger than ZFC.
In all the cases examined so far, a central problem has still to be overcome: none of these
systems allow for the construction of the category of functors between two arbitrary catego-
ries. We can form the category of functors from a small category to an arbitrary one,22 but this
construction still remains illegitimate when the domain of these functors is a large category.
However, to a great extent all these systems are expressive enough to cope with the cases of
interest: even if the functor category seems a perfectly reasonable construction which can be
performed regardless of size issues, most of category theory can be developed confining our
attention to those functors whose domain is a small category. This limitation is consistent
with the one on completeness.23
In summary, the foundational frameworks considered so far fulfil (with different degrees
of approximation) the requirements (A) and (B) (p. 4), but none of them manages to satisfy
(C) in its full generality. To sum up relative consistency of these systems (D) we can say
that Vα models ZFC if and only if (Vα, Def(Vα))24 models NBG. If α is an inaccessible than
(Vα, Vα+1) models both NBG and MK.
5 Large categories and Universes
small = “∈ U” /large = “∈ U”
It is difficult to trace back to the first appearance of the concept of a universe. Essen-
tially, it captures the idea of a collection closed under certain operations. But why introduce
universes in the context of set-theoretic foundations of category theory? As Shulman (2008)
suggests, we can reason as follows: on an informal level what we need for freely manipulating
large categories seems to be a theory of classes which resembles closely ZFC; in practice it
should be enough to have two copies of the axioms of ZFC, once for sets, once for classes. On
a formal level, universes are introduced as a more elegant (and economic) solution to the
same problem: instead of rewriting twice the axioms of ZFC we identify specific sets in our
system as good candidates to interpret large collections.
5.1 Grothendieck’s universes
As the name of this subsection suggests, the use of universes as foundational recipe for cate-
gory theory goes back to Grothendieck. The purpose of his project, closely related to Bourba-
21When proving a statement ϕ(n) by induction in ZFC or NBG we usually form the set {n ∈ N |¬ϕ(n)} and then
use the fact that N is well-ordered. Since this argument involves an istance of comprehension, it can be carried on
into these systems just in case ϕ does not involve quantifiers over classes.
22This is allowed in all the cases examined so far: for example in ZFC a functor F : C → D, where C is a small
category, is itself a set by replacement, and therefore the collection of all these functors form a class.
23See here definition 2.
24Def(X) denotes the set of all the subsets definable from element of X, i.e. sets of the form {x ∈ X|ϕ(x)}, where
φ(x) can contain parameters from X and all its quantifiers range only over elements of X.
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ki, was to justify the use of category theory in mathematical practice (and in Grothendick’s
perspective specifically in Algebraic Geometry).
Here is the definition of universe:25
Definition 5. A set U is a Grothendieck universe if the following conditions hold:
(i) if y ∈ x ∈ U, theny ∈ U ;
(ii) if x, y ∈ U, then{x, y} ∈ U ;
(iii) if x ∈ U, then℘(x) ∈ U ;
(iv) if (xi)i∈I is a family of elements of U , and I ∈ U , then
⋃
i∈I xi ∈ U .
In words, the definition says that U is a Grothendick universe if it is a transitive set closed
under pairs,26 power set and union of elements of U indexed by an element of U . In a more set-
theoretical flavour, we can describe this definition as requiring U = Vκ for some inaccessible
cardinal κ (under the added hypothesis that U is uncountable27). Since inaccessible cardinals
cannot be proved to exist in ZFC,28 asserting the existence of a Grothendieck universe is a
genuine strengthening of ZFC’s axioms.
For a fixed Grothendieck universe U , we can rephrase our dichotomy between small and
large by calling a category large whenever its collection of objects is a set not belonging to U .
In case the universe is uncountable this is equivalent to assert that a category is small if and
only if its collection of objects has rank less than κ, where κ is inaccessible.
This third approach, does not just give a satisfactory solution to conditions (A) and (B)
(page 4), but it also allows for the construction of the category of functors between arbitrary
categories (requirement C). In addition, it gives a more expressive semantics for the term
large: we do not collapse every large collection to the size of V , as it happens in NBG, but we
can retain a more careful distinction between small, large and even larger categories.
The following example gives an idea of the expressive power that we reach when introdu-
cing universes in the metatheory.
Example 7. Every large category C has a category of presheaves SetCop , and, if C is locally
small29 we can consider the Yoneda embedding y : C ↪→ SetCop .
Nevertheless we might want to be able to encode more abstract nonsense, and not satisfied
by a single universe, we would like to have at our disposal a bigger universe U ′ (i.e. another
inaccessible cardinal λ > κ), and then one other above.30 For this reason Grothendieck’s ini-
tial proposal consisted of adding not just a single universe but an abundance. Formally we
can express this by adding to the usual axioms of ZFC the following:
25In the original presentation (Bourbaki (1972), p. 185) the definition of universe also includes closure under
ordered pairs which are a primitive notion in Bourbaki’s presentation.
26We do not assume as primitive the notion of ordered pair but, as usual, we define them à la Kuratowski: (x, y) =
{{x}, {x, y}}.
27If we do not make any condition on the cardinality of U , also the emptyset, ∅, and ω are Grothendieck universes.
28A simple argument is the following: since Vκ, for κ inaccessible, represents a model of ZFC, if it was possible to
prove the existence of such a cardinal in ZFC, then ZFC would also prove its own consistency, contradicting Gödel’s
second incompletness theorem.
29See table on page 14 for the definition of a locally small category in presence of a universe.
30One possible reason is that we do not want just to consider the category of all small categories but also the
category of all large ones, or of all locally small ones. . .
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Grothendick’s axiom. Every set is contained in some universe.
This axiom guarantees the existence of sufficient large sets where every possible category
we can meet is included.31 Clearly, we have moved far from the strength of ZFC: the system
obtained by adding Grothendieck’s axiom to ZFC has the same consistency as ZFC + “there
exist inaccessible cardinals of arbitrary size”. As noticed by Mac Lane32 this axiom does not
solve definitely all the problems. We do not have any a priori certainty that changing uni-
verse does not affect the construction of our categories, or preserves all the properties of a
specific object. Consider the following example
Example 8. Let us assume that we have proved, for some property φ, the existence of a group
G such that φ(G,H) is true for every small group H (for example φ could tell us that G is the
limit of some diagram in Grp). The same argument still holds if we interpret the notion of
largeness with some specific inaccessible κ, but there is no guarantee that the group G will be
the same under all the possible interpretations.
As kindly pointed out by one of the anonymous referees, in order to obtain this stron-
ger property we should ask for the universe U to be an elementary substructure of V . For
this, stronger axioms of infinity are needed, namely we have to ask for the cardinality of the
universe to be at least a Mahlo number. The introduction of such large cardinals can be re-
lated to a general reflection principle for ZFC.33 Even if the existence of these cardinals are
given by axioms stronger than the one asserting the existence of a single inaccessible, and
also stronger than Grothendieck’s axiom, these axioms are still quite “weak” if compared to
current large cardinal axioms used by set theorists. A similar approach based on a general
reflection principle has been sketched by Engeler and Röhrl (1969). The following quotation
concludes the paragraph where the two authors describe their proposal:34
[. . . ] However, the main objection to this approach is quite independent of the
strength and questionability of the additional assumptions creating universes. We
believe that it is a faulty to make a procrustes bed of set theory and try, bend or
break, to fit all mathematical structures into it. This does injustice, in particular
to category theory, as it denies the autonomous role that such theories play in
mathematics.
To conclude our survey of the use of universes as foundation for category theory, we can
sum up the situation with the following table:35
31As Shulman (2008) notes, this axiom asserts the possibility to enlarge the universe, more than asserting the
existence of multiple stratified universes.
32See Lane (1969), p. 2.
33The interested reader should consult Lévy (1960). We will come back on a much weaker formulation of the
reflection principle in section 5.3.
34See E. Engler (1969), p. 62.
35Observe that we can always identify objects of C with identity morphisms. In this table we indicate with
Morph(C) the collection of morphisms of a category C, and with HomC(c,d) the set of morphisms between two given
objects c, d of C.
51
Rivista Italiana di Filosofia Analitica Junior 2:2 (2011)
small Morph(C) ∈ U
locally ∀c, d ∈ Obj(C) ∈ U
small HomC(c, d) ∈ U
large Morph(C) ⊆ U ,
Morph(C) /∈ U
enormous Morph(C) * U
5.2 Mac Lane’s proposal
[. . . ] It turns out that a flexible and effective formula-
tion of the present notions of category theory can be gi-
ven with a more modest addition to the standard axio-
matic set theory: the assumption that there is one
universe.
Saunders Lane (1969), p. 193.
As we have already mentioned in the last paragraph, one of the first mathematician who
highlighted some problems of the foundational approach proposed by the French school of
Grothendieck was Saunders Mac Lane, one of the founders of category theory.
In 1969 Mac Lane published a paper with a meaningful title: One universe for the founda-
tions of category theory. In this work he argues that the existence of a single universe in ZFC
is sufficient to have a foundational framework for category theory. His proposal essentially
consists in weakening Grothendieck’s axiom asking, not for an abundance of universes, but
just one.
Mac Lane defines a universe as follows:
Definition 6. A set U is called a universe if:
(1) x ∈ y ∈ Uimpliesx ∈ U ;
(2) ω ∈ U ;
(3) x ∈ Uimplies℘(x) ∈ U ;
(4) x ∈ Uimplies⋃x ∈ U ;
(5) if f : x→ y is a surjective function such that x ∈ U and y ⊂ U , then y ∈ U .
As Mac Lane notices, the conjunction of condition (4) and (5) is equivalent to condition (iv)
in definition 5. Apart from this and the requirement that U is uncountable (condition (2) and
(3)), the definition is the same as that given by Bourbaki.36
In this framework the systematization of the dichotomy small/large is essentially the
same as that of Grothendieck’s school (See table on page 14). The restriction to a single
36We also recall the treatment of ordered pairs as a primitive entity, characteristic of Bourbaki’s approach.
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universe allows for a (almost37) complete treatment of category theory and, at the same time,
allows us to escape from the “jungle” of multiple universes.38
Finally we remark that consistency of Mac Lane’s proposal amounts to the consistency of
ZFC + “there exists a strong inaccessible cardinal”.
5.3 Feferman’s proposal
Foundations of category theory have represented a problem of major interest for Solomon
Feferman, who came back to this topic several times during the last forty years. He dedicated
four papers39 to this issue, proposing more than a single solution. Here we confine ourselves
to the analysis of his first proposal.
The first paper where Feferman addresses the question was published in 1969.40 In this
work he proposes an alternative to the solution of adopting new axioms for universes. Fe-
ferman’s idea consists in using a well-known principle of set theory, namely the reflection
principle.
Feferman’s system, which we indicate as ZFC/s,41 consists, in the first instance, in adding
a new constant symbol s to the usual language of ZFC. Secondly we add to the axioms of ZFC
further axioms in order to describe (the interpretation of) s as a natural model of ZFC.42
Before giving the axioms we recall that if ϕ is a formula of the language of ZFC, its relativi-
zation to s, denoted by ϕs , is given when all the quantifiers that occur in ϕ are bounded by s.43
Definition 7. The system ZFC/s is given in the language L of ZFC extended with the constant
symbol s by the following axioms:
(1) Axioms of ZFC: extensionality, emptyset, pairs, union, powerset, infinity, foundation,
replacement, choice.
(2) s is not empty:
∃x(x ∈ s)
(3) s is transitive:
∀x, y(y ∈ x ∧ x ∈ s→ y ∈ s)
(4) s is closed under subsets:
∀x, y(x ∈ s ∧ ∀z(z ∈ y → z ∈ x)→ y ∈ s)
(5) reflection axioms: for every formula ϕ with free variable x1,. . . , xn:
37This approach does not allow for the construction of the category of all large categories.
38As remarked by one of the anonymous referee, the request of a single universe U inside V could be seen as a
kind of opprobrium from the point of view of a set theoretician. An alternative solution to the universe juggling has
been mentioned at the end of the last section: see for example E. Engler (1969).
39Namely Feferman (1969), Feferman (1977), Feferman (2006), Feferman (2004).
40See Feferman (1969).
41the symbol s stands for smallness.
42A natural model of ZFC, (M, ), is a transitive model of ZFC, closed under subsets: x ⊂ y ∈M implies x ∈M .
43For example, the relativization to s of the formula ∀a∃b∀x(x ∈ b↔ ψ(x, a)) is
∀a ∈ s∃b ∈ s∀x ∈ s(x ∈ b↔ ψs(x, a)).
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∀x1 . . . ∀xn(ϕ(x1, . . . , xn)↔ ϕs(x1, . . . , xn))
The axiom schema (5) can be read in model-theoretic terms as follows: let (M, , S) be a
model of ZFC/s,44 call Ms the set {x ∈ M |xS}, and s the restriction of  to Ms,45 , then
(M, ) is an elementary extension of (Ms, s). In other words the two models satisfy the same
formula in the language L.
As we mentioned, this axiom schema, is based on the reflection principle. A specific istan-
ce of this principle can be suitably reformulated as a theorem of ZFC. It might be helpful to
highlight the common point this reflection theorem shares with the downward Löwenheim-
Skolem theorem. The proof of the latter shows, given a model N of a theory T and an infinite
subset S ⊂ N , how to build a model M , such that M ≺ N (M is an elementary substructure
of N ) and |N | = |S|. In order to obtain the model M we build a sequence of sets Mn in this
way: starting from M0 = S every Mn+1 is obtained from Mn by adding a witness b ∈ N for
every existential sentence ∃yφ(y, x1, . . . , xn) and every n-tuple of elements a1, . . . , an ∈ Mn
such that ∃y ∈ NφN(y, a1, . . . , an) is a true sentence. M is then obtained as
M =
⋃
Mn.
n∈ω
Since there are just a countable amount of sentences φ, the cardinality of the various
Mn never increases. Finally, the countable union of countable sets is still countable from
which it follows that |M | = |S|. This construction can be rearranged to be carried out on
the cumulative hierarchy of Vα’s. Even if this method enables us “to build models of ZFC”,
this does not violate Gödel’s second incompletness theorem. Indeed even if we can reflect
every finite conjunction of sentences of ZFC, we are not able to reflect at once a single infinite
conjunction of sentences expressing that Vκ is a natural model of ZFC for a specific κ.
One of the main advantages of this “logical” approach consists exactly in this: the “formal
description” of s as a “natural model of ZFC” is not sufficient to prove in ZFC that (the inter-
pretation of) s is a natural model of ZFC. This, in fact, allows Feferman to prove the following
important result in Feferman (1977):
Theorem 9. ZFC/s is a conservative extension of ZFC.
This result guarantees that we have not really strengthen our starting set theory; in parti-
cular, in categorical terms this means that all that can be proved in ZFC/s about small objects,
even using large categories, can already be proved in ZFC. Now it should be sufficiently clear
that interpreting small as “element of S” and large as “set not necessarily in S”, what we
have is an appropriate foundational framework where it is possible to interpret definitions
and theorems of category theory.
As in the other cases we can evaluate the expressive power of Feferman’s system using the
conditions on page 4. While we can check that ZFC/s easily meet (A), (B), (D), the problem
with functor categories noticed with other systems is also complicated in this case: we do not
only have a limitation of size for the domain of the functors, but we also have to confine oursel-
ves to consider those functor categories whose objects are S-definable. This is a consequence
of the relativization of the replacement axioms to s, which can be considered to express the
44We indicate with S the element of M which interprets the constant symbol s.
45i.e. xsy iff x, y ∈Ms and xy.
54
Rivista Italiana di Filosofia Analitica Junior 2:2 (2011)
inaccessibility of s under all functions definable in L.46 In other words, if we read the repla-
cement axioms as saying that the image of a set under a class-function is still a set, their
relativization can be rephrased as stating that the image of a set under a function-class whi-
ch is definable from elements of S is still a set. This restriction, even if apparently innocuous,
can have annoying consequences: for example we should change the notion of completeness
(definition 2) in ZFC/s, requiring limits for “all small functors” (i.e functors definable from S)
rather then for all functors with small domain.
5.4 Some comments on Feferman’s proposal
Feferman has been one of the first mathematical-logicians to get interested in foundations of
category theory: his motivation has been primarily to fill the gap between the rapid develop-
ment of category theory and its proper systematization inside the mathematical edifice.
Initially a careful attitude led him to investigate the foundations of this theory with dif-
ferent systems of set theory. Only later he turned his attention to a critical analysis of a
categorical foundation of all mathematics.47
The system proposed by Feferman in Feferman (1969) and the conservativity result over
ZFC are of particular interest for a foundational analysis of category theory. The relevance of
Feferman’s contribution is well expressed in the words of Blass48
This approach developed in Feferman (1969), has two advantages. First, the as-
sumptions guarantee that, if we prove a theorem about small sets by using large
categories, then the same theorem holds for arbitrary sets; [. . . ]. Second, the as-
sumptions do not really go beyond ZFC; any assertion in the first-order language,
not mentioning κ,49 that can be proved using these assumption can also be proved
without them.
The second feature of Feferman’s system mentioned by Blass is the conservativity result of
the previous paragraph (theorem 9). This theorem highlights the “conventional” use of inac-
cessible cardinals when discussing set-theoretic foundation of category theory. As Shulman
notes:
[. . . ] Thus we obtain a precise version of our intuition that the use of inaccessibles
in category theory is merely for convenience: since many categorical proofs stated
using inaccessibles can be formalized in ZFC/s, any consequence of such a theorem
not referring explicitly to inaccessibles is also provable purely in ZFC.
Even if inaccessible cardinals, and in general stronger axioms of infinity, have became
part of modern mathematical research, their use in foundational contexts remains dubious.
Again, in the words of the philosopher Marquis:50
Any reference to inaccessibles is simply removed. This is an exact formulation of
the conviction that questions of size are only used to justify certain general con-
struction and they do not bear on the real mathematical content of the construc-
46See Feferman (1969), p. 208.
47The main argument of his criticism for a possible categorical foundation of all math was firstly formulated in his
’77 paper Feferman (1977). He then came back to the same argument in his successive works.
48Blass (1984), page 8.
49Blass uses κ to indicate the level of the cumulative hierarchy which corresponds to the interpretation of the
added constant symbol s in Feferman’s system.
50Marquis (2009), pp. 183-184.
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tions and its consequences. [. . . ] Feferman’s results51 are important for they can
be interpreted as showing that as far as set theory is concerned, category theory
does not raise new foundational problem.
51The reference is to Feferman (1969).
56
Rivista Italiana di Filosofia Analitica Junior 2:2 (2011)
Riferimenti bibliografici
Awodey, S. (1996). Structuralism in mathematics and logic. Philosophia Mathematica 3(4).
48
Awodey, S. (2004). An Answer to G. Hellman’s Question “Does Category Theory Provide a
Framework for Mathematical Structuralism?”. Philosophia Mathematica 1(12). 48
Blass, A. (1984). The interaction between category theory and set theory. In J. Grey (Ed.),
Mathematical Application of Category Theory. Contemporary Mathematics, vol. 30. 58
Borceaux, F. (1994). Handbook of categorical algebra 1. Basic Category Theory. Cambridge
University Press. 49
Bourbaki, N. (1972). Univers. théorie des topos et cohomologie étale des schémas. Tome 1:
Théorie des topos. In Seminare de Geometrie Algebrique du Bois-Marie 1963-1964 (SGA 4),
pp. 185–217. Berlin: Springer-Verlag. 53
Caramello, O. (2010). The Unification of Mathematics via Topos Theory. 48
E. Engler, H. R. (1969). On the Problem of Foundations of Category Theory. Dialectica 3(1).
54, 56
Feferman, S. (1969). Set-Theoretical Foundations of Category Theory. Reports of the Midwest
Category Seminar III, Lecture Notes in Mathematics 106, 201–247. 56, 58, 59
Feferman, S. (1977). Categorial foundations and foundations of category theory. In Lo-
gic, foundations of mathematics and computability theory, Dordrecht, pp. 149–169. Fifth
Internat. Congr. Logic, Methodology and Philos. of Sci.: Reidel. 56, 57, 58
Feferman, S. (2004). Typical ambiguity: trying to have your cake and eat it too. In G. Link
(Ed.), One hundred years of Russell’s paradox. Berlin. 56
Feferman, S. (2006). Enriched stratified system for the Foundation of Category Theory. In
G. Sica (Ed.), What is category theory? Milano: Polimetrica. 1, 47, 56
Hellman, G. (2003). Does Category Theory Provide a Framework for Mathematical
Structuralism? Philosophia Mathematica 11(2). 48
Hofstadter, D. (1979). Gödel, Escher and Bach. An eternal Golden braid. New York: Basic
Book Inc. Publisher. 45
Joyal, A. (1995). Algebraic set theory. cambridge University Press. 48
Lane, S. M. (1969). One universe as a foundation for category theory. In S. M. Lane (Ed.),
Reports of the Midwest Category Seminar, III, Lecture Notes in Mathematics, Volume 106,
pp. 192–200. New York: Springer-Verlag. 54, 55
Lane, S. M. (1998). Categories for the working mathematician. In Graduate Texts in
Mathematics, second edition, Volume 5. Springer. 50
Lawvere, F. W. (2005). An elementary theory of the category of sets (long version). In Reprints
in Theory and Application of Categories, Volume 11. 48
Lévy, A. (1960). Axiom schemata of strong infinity in axiomatic set theory. Pacific Journal of
Mathematics (10), 223–238. 54
57
Rivista Italiana di Filosofia Analitica Junior 2:2 (2011)
Marquis, J. P. (2009). From a geometrical point of view. A study of the History and Philosophy
of Category Theory. In Series: Logic, Epistemology, and te Unity of Science, Volume 14.
Springer. 48, 58
McLarty, C. (2004). Exploring categorical structuralism. Philosophia Mathematica 3(12). 48
S. Eilenberg, S. M. L. (1945). A General Theory of Natural Equivalences. 58(2), 231–294. 45,
51
Shulman, M. A. (2008). Set theory for category theory. 48, 49, 51, 52, 54
58
